Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

The State of Utah v. Troy Lynn Schultz : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Linda M. Jones, Lisa J. Remal; attorneys for appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Kenneth R.
Updegrove; attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Schultz, No. 20010775 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3483

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
CaseNo.20010775-CA

TROY LYNN SCHULTZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for arson, a third degree felony offense in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) and (3)(b) (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S.
Atherton, Judge, presiding.
LINDA M. JONES (5497)
LISA J. REMAL (2722)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

Utah Court of App^a3o

FEB

1202

Papist stage

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

TROY LYNN SCHULTZ,

CaseNo.20010775-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for arson, a third degree felony offense in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) and (3)(b) (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S.
Atherton, Judge, presiding.
LINDA M. JONES (5497)
LISA J. REMAL (2722)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT

2

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

A. CIVILIANS DID NOT WITNESS SCHULTZ OR ANY PERSON
SET THE VAN ON FIRE.

3

B. THE OFFICERS PROVIDED TESTIMONY ABOUT THEIR
OBSERVATIONS.

6

C. THE "EXPERTS" TESTIFIED TO THE USE OF A FIRE
"ACCELERANT" TO SUPPORT "INTENT" TO COMMIT ARSON.

7

1. Jeffrey Long's "Expert" Testimony Concerning the Use of
Dogs in Detecting Fire Accelerant Was Based in Relevant Part
on Articles He Read.

7

2. Rex Nelson Testified to the Use of His Detection Dog, Oscar.
at the Scene.

11

3. The Expert from the State Crime Lab Could Not Confirm that
Accelerant Was Used in the Fire.

13

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

13

Page
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING LONG AND
NELSON TO TESTIFY REGARDING "CANINE
ACCELERANT DETECTIONS

15

A. THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING CANINE
ACCELERANT DETECTION CONSTITUTED NOVEL.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EVIDENCE. IT WAS
PRESENTED IN VIOLATION OF RIMMASCH.

18

1. The State Failed to Establish the First Factor Set
Forth in Rimmasch: that the Techniques Underlying
Long's and Nelson's Testimony in this Case Were
"Inherently Reliable."

21

(a) The state failed to demonstrate the
correctness of the techniques at issue.

23

(b) The state failed to show that canine
accelerant detection is accurate, reliable.

24

(c) There is no evidence concerning the
"qualifications of those'1 who "actually
gathered the data and analyzed it."

26

2. The State Failed to Present Evidence to Support
that the Dog, Oscar, Had Any Measurable Success
Rate with Respect to Detecting Accelerant.

30

3. The Evidence Concerning Canine Accelerant
Detection Was Confusing and Conflicting. It Lacked
Probable Value and Should Have Been Excluded at
Trial.

32

ii

Page
4. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. Based on
the Paucity of Evidence on the Matter, a Mindful Judge
Would Have Excluded Evidence Relating to Canine
Accelerant Detection.
B. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL
REQUIRING REVERSAL.
CONCLUSION

36

38
44

Addendum A: Judgment
Addendum B: Utah R. Evid. 702

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Brewer v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad,
2001 UT 77, 31 P.3d 557

21, 22, 30

Campbell v. State Farm Insurance Co.. 2001 UT 89,
432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44

33, 38

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Inc.. 509 U.S. 579
(1993)

18, 19

Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Foote. 14 S.W.3d 512
(Ark. 2000)

18, 19, 22, 37

Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, 987 P.2d 22

20-23, 25, 26, 29

Green v. Louder. 2001 UT 62, 29 P.3d 638

19

Iselv v. Capuchin Province. 877 F.Supp. 1055 (E.D. Mich. 1995)

23

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 526 U.S. 137 (1997)

20

Pack v. Case. 2001 UT App 232, 30 P.3d 436

28

Patev v. Lainhart. 1999 UT 31

29,31,40

People v. Acri. 662 N.E.2d 115 (111. 1996)

19, 22, 37

Phillips v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1980)

36

State v. Adams. 2000 UT 42, 5 P.3d 642

19

State v. Andreason. 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986)

44

iv

Page
State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997)

21, 30, 31, 35

State v. Butterfield. 2001 UT 59

2, 20-22

State v. Bvrd. 937 P.2d 532 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)

43

State v. Clayton. 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982)

29

State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996)

14, 18, 20, 21, 28,
30,33,35,36

State v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
State v. Kellev. 2000 UT 41, 1 P.3d 546

2
19, 28, 29, 31

State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993)

33

State v. McCovey. 803 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1990)

2

State v. Mead. 2001 UT 58, 27 P.3d 1115

14, 20, 33

State v. Mitchell. 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989)
State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989)

38
1, 14, 18-23, 27, 28,
30-33, 36, 38, 39

State v. Troy. 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984)

44

U.S. v. Murray. 784 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986)

35

U.S. v. Williams. 69 F.3d 27 (5th Cir. 1995)

19

STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-21 (1998)

19
v

Page

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b) and (3)(b) (1999)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996)

1

Utah R. Evid. 403 (2001)

20, 33

Utah R. Evid. 702 (2001)

2, 18, 20, 31, 33
OTHER AUTHORITIES

NFPA921 Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations (2001 ed.)

10,40

Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 1999)
251

18

Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence
Law 7-9 (996)

33

vi

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V.

TROY LYNN SCHULTZ,
Defendant/Appellant.

:

CaseNo.20010775-CA
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or
capital felony offense. In the underlying case to this matter, Appellant Troy Schultz was
convicted of arson, a third degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-102(l)(b)
and (3)(b) (1999). A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows: Whether the trial court erred in
allowing the state to admit testimony into evidence concerning the use of a dog to detect
accelerant at the scene of the fire, where such testimony lacked foundation and was in
violation of State v. Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989).
Standard of Review: "Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining the
admissibility of expert testimony, '"and such decisions are reviewed under an abuse of

discretion standard.'"" State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^[28, 27 P.3d 1133 (cites
omitted). See also State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708, 713 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (in reviewing
a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence, this Court will examine "(1)
whether the trial court selected the correct rule of evidence, (2) whether the trial court
correctly interpreted that rule, and (3) whether the trial court correctly applied the rule").
An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial judge has failed to comply with the
law. See State v. McCovev. 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990). In addition, if "no
reasonable [person] would take the view adopted by the trial court," the trial court's
decision constitutes an abuse of discretion. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^[28 (cite omitted).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
The issue is preserved in the record on appeal at 206:3-7, and 207:148-151.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following provision will be determinative of the issue on appeal: Utah Rules
of Evidence 702 (2001). The text of that provision is contained in Addendum B hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below.
On August 9, 2000, the state filed charges against Schultz for aggravated arson,
arson, and aggravated assault. (R. 5-7.) The charge for aggravated arson was dismissed
(R. 5, 48), and the state proceeded with the matter to trial on the remaining charges for
arson and aggravated assault.
2

On May 16, 2001, the court commenced a two-day jury trial in the matter. (R. 8991, 206, 207.) At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Schultz guilty of arson, and not
guilty of aggravated assault. (R. 134, 135.) Schultz is appealing from the entry of final
judgment in this case. (SeeR. 178-80, 185-86.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state presented testimony at trial from civilians, police officers who responded
to the scene of a van fire, and "experts." Schultz has divided the Statement of Facts into
those three categories. The state's evidence at trial was as follows.
A. CIVILIANS DID NOT WITNESS SCHULTZ OR ANY PERSON SET THE
VAN ON FIRE.
The "Mr. Cineloa" Restaurant was located on Main Street in Salt Lake City, in an
L-shaped building along with two bars and Gene's Barber Shop. Mr. Cineloa and the two
bars were on the west side of Main Street with the barber shop around the corner, facing
north on the short end of the L-shaped building. (R. 206:29-32.)
On August 6, 2000, shortly after 3:00 p.m., Teresa Villegas drove to the restaurant
in a van to pick up her husband, Roberto Espinoza. (R. 206:20.) Villegas parked the van
in a lot behind the restaurant and left her two sons there to watch a television inside the
van. (R. 206:21-22; 206:36.) Villegas entered the Mr. Cineloa restaurant with her
daughters and met with her husband. (R. 206:21; 206:35.)
Espinoza testified that 15 to 30 minutes after his wife arrived, they were alerted to

3

a fire. (R. 206:22, 29; 206:36.) They rushed outside and observed smoke and flames
coming from their van. (Id, at 23, 36.) The van, valued between $1,000 and $5,000, was
a total loss. (Id, at 24-25.) The boys were safe, outside playing. (Id, at 25, 36.)
During the fire, Espinoza and Villegas observed a man on the roof of the L-shaped
building. (R. 206:37.) They were not able to identify him. (R. 206:25-26; 206:38.)
Meanwhile, from an apartment on the other side of Main Street, John Pavelchak
was watching television with a friend. His attention was diverted to three individuals in
front of Willey's Bar engaged in a fight.1 The individuals were "yelling and screaming"
at each other and he observed the men in "fisticuffs." (R. 206:43-45; 206:62.) After the
altercation ended, two of the individuals went inside the bar, while the third remained
outside. (Id, at 46.) The third individual looked around on the ground near the parking lot
area, then he ran across the street and looked on the ground below the apartment where
Pavelchak was observing the matter. (See id. at 46-47, 65.) The individual disappeared
from view for a while. (See id, at 66.)
Pavelchak testified that while the individual was searching the ground, he
murmured something like, "I'm going to get you guys." (R. 206:46-48.)
Later, Pavelchak saw the man on top of the roof of the L-shaped building "trying
to put - it looked like a cloth into a ventilation duct." (R. 206:52.) Pavelchak was unsure

1 Willey's Bar is located in the L-shaped building.
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about that observation, and he could not say whether the man managed to put the "cloth"
in the "vent." (R. 206:52-53.) Pavelchak also observed "a huge plume of black smoke"
across the street in the area of the bar. (R. 206:48.)
Pavelchak ran to the bar and warned patrons inside that it was on fire. (R. 206:49;
id. at 67.) When Pavelchak came out of the bar, he realized the smoke was coming from
behind the building. Pavelchak then noticed a man on the roof looking down at him. (See
id. at 50, 68.) The man disappeared from view until Pavelchak rounded the building and
observed the man jump from the roof. (Id. at 50.) The man ran north on Main Street with
Pavelchak chasing him. (Id, at 51, 69.) Pavelchak and the man ran for half a block, then
turned into a driveway (id. at 54, 69) and between two houses to a parking lot. There the
man stopped and faced Pavelchak with a knife in his hand. (Id. at 55, 70-71.) Pavelchak
knocked the knife to the ground and ripped the man's shirt. (kL at 58.) The man took off
again and climbed over a fence, beyond Pavelchak's reach. (Id. at 71-72.) Pavelchak
identified the man as the defendant, Troy Schultz. (Id. at 59-60.)
Next, Lori Stapley testified. She stated that on August 6, she drove toward Main
Street up 1700 South with her daughter, Charli. They observed the van smoking. (R.
206:78; 206: 87.) They also observed a man standing by the van. (R. 206:81.) According to Charli, the man was throwing "a rag or a white napkin into the van." (R. 206:87,
91.) Stapley and her daughter saw the man run up Main Street. (R. 206:82-83; 206:88.)
At trial, both Stapley and Charli provided a general description of the man, and
5

they testified that the week before trial, officers presented a picture to them of the
defendant in a police car. The officers asked if the person in the picture resembled the
person Stapley and her daughter saw by the van on August 6. (R. 206:79-80; 206:89-90.)
Stapley testified at trial that the picture of Schultz was "quite a bit like the gentleman" she
saw by the van, and Charli could not say for sure whether the man in the picture was the
person she observed by the van. (R. 206:79-80; 206:90, 94.)
The state also called Patrick Crofoot to testify at trial. According to Crofoot, he
was at his brother's house two blocks from the scene when he observed a plume of black
smoke in the direction of Main Street and 1700 South. (R. 206:96-97.) Crofoot rode to
the scene on his motorcycle, saw defendant on the roof of the businesses (id. at 108-09),
and ultimately joined on his motorcycle in the chase after defendant. Crofoot continued
the chase on foot over a fence until defendant ran out of Crofoot's reach. (Id at 98-99.)
Crofoot returned to his motorcycle and rode up and down the streets until he saw the
defendant in handcuffs with officers. (Id. at 100.) Crofoot spoke with an officer about
the fire, when Schultz interrupted to say "something about he didn't mean to ['catch the
van on fire/] it was an accident." (id. at 101-02.) Crofoot identified Schultz as the
person he chased and as the person who made the statements on August 6. (Id. at 102.)
B. THE OFFICERS PROVIDED TESTIMONY ABOUT THEIR
OBSERVATIONS.
After the civilians testified, the state called two officers to the witness stand.
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Officer Lisa Pascaldo arrested Schultz. She testified that after the arrest (see R. 206:11920), an individual came up to her on a motorcycle and talked to her "about what was
happening." (R.206:120.) During the conversation, Schultz spontaneously said, "I didn't
mean to do it. I didn't mean to hurt anybody." (R. 206:121.)
Next, Officer Shanelle Boyd testified that she was at the fire scene to direct traffic.
While she was on the scene, Pavelchak handed a shirt and pocketknife to her that he had
taken from the defendant during the chase. (R. 207:180-81.)
C. THE "EXPERTS" TESTIFIED TO THE USE OF A FIRE "ACCELERANT"
TO SUPPORT "INTENT" TO COMMIT ARSON.
The state called three "experts" to testify: Jeffrey Long, Rex Nelson, and Jennifer
McNair. They testified to the alleged use in this case of a fire accelerant.
1. Jeffrey Long's "Expert" Testimony Concerning the Use of Dogs in Detecting
Fire Accelerant Was Based in Relevant Part on Articles He Read.
Long testified to his qualifications as an investigator, where he had taken classes,
and participated and certified in fire investigation courses and techniques. (R. 207:13233.) Long also served in various positions of authority and he served on a committee for
the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which published a manual setting forth
guidelines, standards and codes for "worldwide" fire investigation. (IdL at 133-34.)
Long explained the process for determining the "origin and cause of a fire (R.
207:135-137), and he described how an accelerant may be used to start and/or escalate a
fire. (Id. at 138.) According to Long, when investigating afire,he assesses whether the
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"fuel load" or the area feeding the fire is "normally supposed to burn" fast. (Id at 139.)
Long testified that a vehicle has a "lot of fuel load," including plastics, wiring,
polyurethane foam, and carpet, all of which burn quickly. (IdL at 139.)
Long described the use of "an accelerant detection canine" in fire investigations,
and he testified that the county fire department used two such dogs in their investigations.
(R. 207:142-43.) Long identified a book described as the 2001 edition of the NFPA921,
and he testified that "Dr. DeHann" developed those portions of the book concerning
"canine teams." (IcL at 143.) Long testified that DeHann was a "true expert" in the field
and he identified an additional manual and an article written by DeHann. (Id. at 144.)
Long made references to the 2001 edition of the NFPA921 and testified that
"scientific method[s]" in the book were "based on studies." (R. 207:144-45.) Although
Long did not participate in the studies, his committee for the NFPA apparently assessed
whether the studies were relevant for publication in the book. (R. 207:144-45.)
Long testified to his "thoughts" (see R. 207:145 (prosecutor specifically did not
ask Long about "truths" but asked only about "general thoughts")) on "canines and their
value to fire investigation." (R. 207:145.) According to Long, "the canine is just a tool,"
in that it is brought to a fire scene to see whether it will "alert" to areas where an
accelerant may have been used. (R. 207:145.) If the dog alerts, fire officials will take a
sample of the area and place it in a can for laboratory testing. (R. 207:146.)
According to Long, a dog may alert to the use of an accelerant that is not detected
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in laboratory testing. (R. 207:146-47.) Long also acknowledged that in certain situations
the dog may give a "false positive" alert, meaning the dog may alert when no accelerant
has been used. (R. 207:171.)
Long's testimony concerning the use of dogs for accelerant detection was based on
his review of articles (R. 207:149-50) concerning studies that "were actually" performed.
(R. 207:150-51.) There is no indication that Long personally participated in or observed
the actual studies. (See R. 207: 131-178, generally.) In addition, Long read from an
article published in the NFPA921, which stated the following:
[LONG]: . . . The [NFPA921 states that the] proper use of detection canines is to
assist with the location of [the] selection of samples. In order for the presence or
absence of an ignitable liquid to be scientifically confirmed in the sample, that
sample should be analyzed by a laboratory in accordance with 14.5.3. Any canine
alert not confirmed by laboratory analysis should not be considered validated.
Research has shown that canines have responded or have been alerted to
[pyrolysis products] - the word [pyrolysis] - may I explain that?
THE COURT: You may.
[LONG]: [inaudible] is actually burning of the [inaudible]. Okay, that's where the
word pyromaniac, pyro [comes from]. [Canines have responded to pyrolysis
products that are not produced by an ignitable liquid and] have not always
responded when ignitable liquid accelerant was known to be present. If the
investigator feels that there [were] indicators of an accelerant, samples should be
taken even in the absence of canine alert.
The canine olfactory system is believed to be capable of detecting gasoline
in concentration below those normally cited for [laboratory] methods. The
detection limit, however, is not the sole criteria for even the most important for any
forensic technique. Scientifically - or specifically the ability to distinguish
between ignitable liquids and background materials is even more important than
sensitivity for detection of any ignitable liquid residue.
Unlike explosives or drug[] detecting dogs, these canines are trained to
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detect substances that are common to our everyday environment.
The techniques exists today for forensic laboratories to detect sub-micro liter
quantities of ignitable liquids, but because these substances are intrinsic to our mechanized world, [merely] detecting such quantities is of limited evidential value.
Current research does not indicate which individual chemical compound or
classes of chemical compounds are key triggers for canine alert. Research reveals
that most classes of compound contain ignitable liquid [that] may be produced
from the burning of common synthetic materials. That would be your foam in the
couch. Laboratories that use ASTM guidelines have minimum standards that
define most chemical compounds that must be present in order to make a positive
determination. The sheer variety of [pyrolysis] products present in a fire scene
suggest possible reason for some unconfirmed alerts by canines. The
discriminatory ability of a canine is to distinguish between pyrolysis products and
ignitable liquids is remarkable but not [infallible].
(R. 207:152-54); NFPA921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Invest. (2001 ed.) §14.5.3.5.
Long testified that an accelerant detection dog was used at the scene of the fire in
this case. It "alerted" to two areas in the van: an area behind a passenger seat and an area
to the left of the first alert. (R. 207:156-57.) Long collected samples from the areas and
submitted them to the State Crime Laboratory for testing. (R. 207:159, 165.)
On cross-examination, Long acknowledged that according to early literature,
trained dogs make accurate alerts between 50 and 82 percent of the time. (R. 207:171.)
In addition, Long acknowledged that authorities "hop[ed],f "canines could pass with a 75
percent accuracy rate" in accelerant detection. (R. 207:172.)
Long provided an opinion as to the "point of origin" of the fire in this case, and the
cause of the fire. He stated the fire started in the area where the dog "alerted." (R.
207:165, 163.) Long also testified that the fire was "intentionally set. It was arson -
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incendiary." (R. 207:202.) Long testified that "burn patterns on the carpet" were too
irregular for the fire to be "anything other than an ignitable liquid," and the rate of
acceleration — that is, "how fast the fire grew" - supported the use of flammable liquid in
this case. (R. 207:202.) Long did not specifically describe the irregular "burn patterns"
on the carpet or indicate how "fast" the fire grew. (R. 207:155-68; see 206:29 (the van
may have been unoccupied for 15 to 30 minutes).) Long also admitted that he relied on
Oscar to identify the point of origin. (R. 207:155-56; 207:163.)
2. Rex Nelson Testified to the Use of His Detection Dog, Oscar, at the Scene.
Rex Nelson testified that he works for the Salt Lake County Fire Department and
is the handler for the "accelerant detection dog," Oscar. (R. 207:184.) Oscar was trained
over several weeks in a program in Virginia to alert on "about eight or nine different
odors," and according to Nelson, Oscar's training continues daily. (R. 207:185-86, 19194.) Nelson testified that Oscar graduated from the Virginia program and he received a
diploma less than 2 months prior to the events in this case. (R. 207:186-87, 192.) Nelson
described Oscar's detection process as follows:
Oscar is trained to sniff, he'll hit the accelerant, he'll sit and he'll stay until
he's fed. I put pressure on his leash to make sure it's not a false positive, one of
the tests that we use. He sits, he gets fed, gets rewarded, he gets - I'm giving him
the seek command to show me, he'll put his nose right on the spot that he's
alerting to, he gets fed again. So he'll get fed twice at every spot.
(R. 207:187.)
Nelson testified that on August 6, he and Oscar were called to the van fire on Main
11

Street. In accordance with the process described above, Oscar made two alerts in the
van. (R. 207:188.) Nelson then ran a "discrimination line" with Oscar as follows:
Typically what we do, we do the discrimination line. What a discrimination line
does for us is it pretty much eliminates the possibility of [Oscar] making a false
alert. What that means is we'll take a sample and by running it through a van or a
fire scene whatever it might be[,] there are areas that he doesn't alert to in the []
burned products in the car. We'll take the two samples.. .we place them in one
gallon cans, we place those outside the van. We take additional fire debris and
place it with the samples. I run Oscar over all of the fire debris, it's called a
discrimination line to see if he can discriminate between the products that he hit
initially and the other destructors that we place there with the original hits. In this
case, we placed them outside the van, I ran Oscar over the discrimination line, and
he hit on the two suspect samples, but did not hit on the additional.. .fire debris
that we had placed out there.
(R. 207:189.) Nelson later took Oscar to the police station and presented items to him
that belonged to Schultz. Oscar ''alerted" to Schultz's socks and shoes. (R. 207:190.)
The state presented no evidence to support the accuracy of canine accelerant
detection in controlled studies. (See R. 207:171 (early studies reported a 50 to 82 %
accuracy rate for canine accelerant detection).) Likewise, the state presented no evidence
concerning the success rate for dogs graduating from the Virginia program, and no
evidence as to the success rate for Oscar in alerting for accelerant. (See record generally.)
On cross-examination, counsel for the defense asked Nelson the following: "Oscar
has made a mistake in that he had hit on something that he's not trained to hit on,
correct?" Nelson was unable to answer that question: "I don't know the answer to that.
Oscar has hit on items that have come back from the lab as no identifiable hydrocarbons.
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It's possible, but we don't know." (R. 207:195.)
3. The Expert from the State Crime Lab Could Not Confirm that Accelerant Was
Used in the Fire.
Jennifer McNair conducted laboratory tests at the State Crime Lab on the samples
Long collected from the van, and on Schultz's socks and shoes. McNair testified that she
did not detect "any ignitable liquid residue" on the samples from the van or on Schultz's
socks. (R. 207:199.) According to McNair, that could mean that no flammable liquid
was used in connection with the fire, or a liquid that evaporated quickly was used and not
detected in laboratory testing. McNair could not provide any further information on the
matter. (R. 207:200-01.)
With respect to Schultz's shoes, McNair testified that she detected toluene, a
solvent that is flammable and used to dissolve paints or plastics. She also testified that
toluene is used in glue for shoes. (R. 207:199-200.) McNair opined that the toluene she
discovered "came from the glue on the shoes" and not from a source independent from
the shoes and related to the fire. (R. 207:200.)
After the state presented its evidence, the jury convicted Schultz of arson. Schultz
is appealing from the final judgment in the matter.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Over the objections of the defense, the state's expert witnesses, Jeffrey Long and
Rex Nelson, were allowed to present novel, scientific and technical evidence at trial.
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Specifically, they testified that Oscar the dog detected fire accelerant in the van. The
testimony relating to Oscar allegedly served to support the state's claim that the fire was
intentionally set. The evidence was inadmissible under Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, State v.
Crosby. 927 P.2d 638 (Utah 1996), and the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Pursuant to Utah law the proponent of novel, scientific or technical evidence must
prove the following: (l)f,the scientific principles and techniques underlying the expert's
testimony are inherently reliable," Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641, (2)"the scientific principles or
techniques at issue have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by sufficiently qualified experts," kL (note and cites omitted), and (3) the scientific or technical
evidence at issue is more probative than prejudicial. Id.; see also State v. Mead. 2001 UT
58, TJ40, 27 P.3d 1115; Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388.
In this case, the state failed to establish each of the factors identified above as they
related to canine accelerant detection. First, the state's witnesses failed to make a
foundational showing under the "inherent reliability" prong. Among other things, the
state did not provide any evidence concerning the reliability of the scientific techniques at
issue, or the ability — through use of reliable methods — to ascertain whether a dog has
provided an accurate alert or a "false positive" alert for ignitable liquid. The lack of
information placed the validity of the techniques in question. On cross-examination, the
state's experts admitted that early studies showed the success rate for "canine accelerant
detection" was as low as 50 percent, thereby supporting the determination that the
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scientific methods and techniques at issue were not reliable.
Where the record failed to support inherent reliability, the evidence concerning
canine accelerant detection lacked foundation and was inadmissible.
Second, the experts failed to establish that Oscar the dog had any measurable or
known success rate in allegedly detecting accelerant. Indeed, the state's witnesses were
unable to say whether Oscar could accurately detect accelerant.
Third, the evidence offered through Jeffrey Long and Rex Nelson was more
prejudicial than probative. It likely confused jurors and gave them the false impression
that they could rely on evidence of canine accelerant detection.
Finally, the inadmissible evidence prejudiced Schultz and denied him the right to a
fair trial. In this case the officers should not have been allowed to testify to "canine accelerant detection," and they should not have been allowed to bring Oscar into the courtroom so that jurors could observe that he was obedient during testimony on the matter.
For the reasons more fully set forth below, Schultz is entitled to a new trial without the
"expert" testimony from Long and Nelson concerning "canine accelerant detection."
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING LONG AND NELSON TO
TESTIFY REGARDING "CANINE ACCELERANT DETECTION.1
The state presented the theory at trial that Oscar the dog alerted to the use of
flammable liquids at the scene of a fire. (R. 207:163, 165; 207:185-89.) Both Jeffrey

15

Long and Rex Nelson testified to the general use of dogs in detecting fire accelerant and
to the events of August 6. Long testified that when he investigated the van fire, he
engaged in his routine investigative techniques. However, based on those techniques, he
was unable to ascertain the origin of the fire. Long stated the following:
[LONG]: In that vehicle it showed that there was fire in the [inaudible] of the van,
with the V pattern going up from it. The vehicle side door was open, which was
consistent with what the owner said, plus also the firefighters' efforts and the
windows had been blown out by the fire. So I started the area of origin from both
the back of the vehicle and worked towards the center.
[PROSECUTOR]: And did you find a point of origin?
[LONG]: At that time, no I did not. I saw some unusual burn patterns in the van.
I also - based on what I had seen on other vehicle fires from the time the fire
burned, the fire burned too fast for - had too much damage for the amount of time
it was not being occupied, so at that time I contacted investigator Rex Nelson to
bring in a canine [inaudible].
(R. 207:155-56.) According to Long, Rex Nelson arrived with Oscar the dog. When
Nelson and Oscar investigated the scene, Oscar "made two alerts," one behind the passenger's seat and one behind the driver's seat in the van. (R. 207:156-57.) Based on those
alerts, Long was able to make other observations to formulate an opinion as to the origin
and the cause of the fire. Long observed a V pattern and he observed the collapsed roof
below where Oscar alerted. Long also observed "irregular burn patterns" (R. 207:163).
Long testified that in his opinion the fire originated in the area where the dog
alerted for accelerant (R. 207:163-65). He also provided his opinion as it related to the
cause of fire: "I determined that the fire was intentionally set. It was arson - incendiary."
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(R. 207:202.) His opinion concerning the cause also focused on accelerant.
Significantly, Long admitted that before Nelson brought Oscar to the scene, Long
was unable to ascertain the origin and cause of the fire. (R. 207:155-56.) Long also
testified that in his opinion, he could not "think of any one tool that has been as good as
the canine" in fire investigations. (R. 207:145.)
Long's testimony purportedly provided a foundation for Nelson's testimony
concerning Oscar. Nelson testified that Oscar was trained to detect accelerant, and in this
case, he alerted to accelerant in two places in the van, and he alerted to socks and shoes
belonging to Schultz. (R. 207:185-86, 188-90.)
The state used the evidence concerning Oscar to bolster Long's opinion that the
fire was intentionally set, and to support that Schultz started the fire. (See R. 207:155-56
(Long used Oscar to identify origin); 207:190 (Oscar alerted to Shultz's clothing).)
Yet, additional evidence presented at trial supported that canine accelerant
detection is unreliable. Long admitted that under fire investigation standards, if
independent laboratory testing cannot confirm the use of an accelerant where a dog has
alerted, the alert is invalid. (R. 207:152.) In this case, a technician testified that scientific
laboratory testing could not confirm accelerant where Oscar alerted. (R. 207:197-200.)
Thus, Oscar's alerts were invalid. In addition, Long admitted that according to early
studies, dogs accurately alerted 50 to 82% of the time. That is insufficient.
Long's testimony concerning canine accelerant detection lacked foundation,
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reliability, and probative value under Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, Crosby, 927 P.2d 638,
and the Utah Rules of Evidence. Nelson's testimony was irrelevant, baseless, and
prejudicial. The trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of canine
accelerant detection in this case. Schultz is entitled to a new trial.
A. THE EVIDENCE CONCERNING CANINE ACCELERANT DETECTION
CONSTITUTED NOVEL. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EVIDENCE. IT
WAS PRESENTED IN VIOLATION OF RIMMASCH.
Pursuant to Utah law, expert testimony is admissible under Rule 702, Utah Rules
of Evidence, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
"[Science] represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations
about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement." Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). Scientific evidence consists of the
ability to identify a particular chemical or liquid. Chemicals may be detected and
identified through laboratory testing with proper application of scientific techniques and
principles. See Webster's New World College Dictionary (4th ed. 1999) 251 (defining
"chemistry" as a science dealing with the composition and properties of a substance).
The ability to detect the use of an accelerant at the scene of a fire involves the use
of scientific methods or techniques. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d
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512, 519-20 (Ark. 2000) (applying Daubert-type analysis to testimony concerning canine
accelerant detection); People v. Acrl 662 N.E.2d 115 (111. App. 1996) (applying analysis
for scientific expert testimony to evidence concerning canine accelerant detection).
In this case, the state presented evidence that a dog may be able to detect ignitable
liquids used to start or escalate a fire. Utah courts have not analyzed the use of such
evidence at trial.2 In that regard, "canine accelerant detection" is a new or novel science.
See Farm Bureau Mutual Ins., 14 S.W.3d at 519-20 (finding evidence of canine
accelerant detection to be inadmissible); Acn, 662 N.E.2d at 117 (same).
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that if a party is presenting evidence of novel
scientific or technical principles, that party must satisfy the three-part test set forth in
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388. See State v. Kelley. 2000 UT 41, ^[19, 1 P.3d 546; State v.
Adams. 2000 UT 42,1J16, 5 P.3d 642 (Rimmasch is implicated "when the expert
testimony is 'based on newly discovered principles5"); see also Green v. Louder. 2001 UT

2
While a dog is commonly used to sniff for illegal drugs, courts have considered the
relevance of such evidence as it relates to "probable cause" to search. See e.g. U.S. v.
Williams. 69 F.3d 27, 28 (5th Cir. 1995) (canine inspection for narcotics supported
probable cause). The state's burden of proof in establishing probable cause to search is
lower then the state's burden of proof at trial.
Schultz was unable to find any case in this jurisdiction where the state was allowed
to present evidence of a dog sniff at trial to establish that a substance constituted an illegal
drug. Indeed, the state generally is required to produce laboratory results to establish that
fact. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-21 (1998) (requiring standards for interpretation of
chemical and forensic analysis in determining a controlled substance).
Likewise, Schultz was unable to locate any case in this jurisdiction where the state
was allowed to present evidence at trial of a dog alert for flammable liquid.
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62, ^j27, 29 P.3d 638; Butterfield. 2001 UT 59, ^29 fRimmasch sets forth a "three-part
standard for admitting scientific or technical evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence
702"); Kumho Tire Co. v. CarmichaeL 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1997) (holding that trial
court's gatekeeping responsibility extends to all expert testimony).
The three-part test requires the proponent of the evidence to prove that (1) the
scientific principles or techniques underlying the expert's testimony are "inherently
reliable"; (2) a sufficiently qualified expert "properly applied" the inherently reliable
scientific principles or techniques in this case; and (3) the scientific or technical evidence
at issues is more probative than prejudicial as required by rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641; Mead. 2001 UT 58,140.
The Utah Supreme Court has specified that its opinion in "Rimmasch provides a
detailed and rigorous outline for trial courts to follow when making determinations
concerning the admissibility of scientific evidence." Crosby. 927 P.2d at 642. In
considering the admissibility of scientific or technical evidence, a trial judge "is charged
with the responsibility of being a 'gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize [the] proffered
evidence.'" Franklin v. Stevenson. 1999 UT 61, Tfl2, 987 P.2d 22; see also Kumho Tire.
526 U.S. at 147 (trial court's gatekeeping responsibility extends to all expert testimony).
The novelty of the evidence presented by Long and Nelson in this case required
careful application of the Rimmasch factors. Since the state failed to establish a proper
foundation, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence, Long's and Nelson's
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testimony concerning canine accelerant detection, as further discussed below.
1. The State Failed to Establish the First Factor Set Forth in Rimmasch: that the
Techniques Underlying Long's and Nelson's Testimony in this Case Were
"Inherently Reliable."
"Rimmasch requires a threshold showing that the scientific principles and techniques are inherently reliable.'" Butterfield 2001 UT 59, TJ29; State v. Brown. 948 P.2d
337, 340 (Utah 1997) (the foundational showing must establish inherent reliability). The
Utah Supreme Court has ruled that "evidence not shown to be reliable cannot, as a matter
of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue'
and, therefore, is inadmissible." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, ^f 13 (cite omitted).
"Inherent reliability" may be established in one of two ways. First, it may be
established through "judicial notice" if the "scientific principles and techniques at issue []
have been generally accepted by the 'relevant scientific community.'" Butterfield, 2001
UT 59, T|29 (citing Brown. 948 P.2d at 340). Second,
[i]f judicial notice is inappropriate, "the court must determine whether the party
seeking to have the evidence admitted has sufficiently demonstrated the inherent
reliability of the underlying principles and techniques." State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d
638, 641 (Utah 1996) (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400). This foundational
showing must explore "such questions as the correctness of the scientific principles
underlying the testimony, the accuracy and reliability of the techniques utilized in
applying the principles to the subject matter before the court and in reaching the
conclusion expressed in the opinion, and the qualifications of those actually
gathering the data and analyzing it.... In the absence of such a showing by the
proponent of the evidence and a determination by the [trial] court as to its
threshold reliability, the evidence is inadmissible."
ButterfielcL 2001 UT 59,1J29 (citing Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403); see also Brewer v.
21

Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 2001 UT 77,1J18, 31 P.3d 557.
In this case, the state did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the inherent reliability of canine accelerant detection. (See record in general.) Indeed, there was
no basis for taking judicial notice of the matter. The state did not present information to
support that canine accelerant detection has been generally accepted in the scientific
community or legal community. (See record in general.)
In this matter, the trial court requested "foundation." (R. 206:3-7; 207:150.)3 To
that end, under the first Rimmasch factor, the state was required to establish (a) "the
correctness" of the scientific or technical principles underlying the testimony, (b) "the
accuracy and reliability of the techniques utilized in applying the principles" and in
reaching the conclusion expressed in the opinion, and (c) "the qualifications of those

3
Although the trial court did not take judicial notice of "inherent reliability," this
Court may do so under certain circumstances. On appeal, this Court may look to scientific literature and the decisions of other courts to ascertain whether the technique at issue
has gained a "very high level of reliability." If it has, it is appropriate on appeal to take
judicial notice of reliability. See Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 398; kLat 400; Butterfield, 2001
UT 59, TJ33 n.5; Franklin. 1999 UT 61, ^[14. Significantly, the Utah Supreme Court has
refused to take judicial notice of inherent reliability where "there is no unanimity in the
legal community as to the inherent reliability of the specific technique at issue. See
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 400-01 (recognizing reliability where all courts addressing the
question have affirmed admissibility of the expert testimony).
Considering the matter in this case, courts have refused to find that evidence of
canine accelerant detection is admissible. The techniques are not reliable. Farm Bureau
Mutual Ins., 14 S.W.3d at 519-20 (finding evidence inadmissible where rate of error was
unknown); Acn, 662 N.E.2d at 117 (finding evidence inadmissible). In that regard,
judicial notice would be improper. It would also be improper for the reasons more fully
set forth in this brief. See infra subpoint A. 1., herein.
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persons actually gathering the data and analyzing it." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 403. The
state failed to establish each prong of the reliability factor as explained below. On that
basis alone, the trial court erred in admitting testimony into evidence relating to Oscar.
(a) The state failed to demonstrate the correctness of the techniques at issue.
A party seeking to admit evidence of a new scientific or technical method must
establish the "correctness" of that method before testimony on the matter may be admitted
at trial. Franklin, 1999 UT61,]fl3.
[T]he proffered expert must be able to assure the Court that his/her theories have
some degree of scientific validity and reliability. In particular, the witness should
testify as to whether that theory can be, or has been, tested or corroborated and, if
so, by whom and under what circumstances; whether the theory has been proven
out or not proven out under clinical tests or some other accepted procedure for
bearing it out; and whether the theory has been subjected to other types of peer review. In establishing this, the expert must show that any underlying data and studies upon which he/she relies are of a type reasonably relied upon in his/her field.
Franklin. 1999 UT 61,1J14 (quoting Iselv v. Capuchin Province, 877 F.Supp. 1055, 1064
(E.D.Mich.1995)).
In this case, Long testified that he had been employed with the Salt Lake County
Fire Department for more than 27 years, he was promoted to the position of chief
investigator in 1986, he was involved in training and certification in his field, and he
served on a committee that published the NFPA921 setting forth standards and methods
for fire investigation. (R. 207:132-34.)
According to Long, before the committee may publish a new investigation method
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or technique in the NFPA921, the method must undergo rigorous testing. (R. 207:144.)
Long testified that the NFPA921 supported the use of dogs in detecting accelerant
at the scene of a fire, and that the use of a dog for that purpose had been tested. (R.
207:142-44.) Long did not provide any further information as it related to testing.
The state failed to present evidence as to how canine accelerant detection was
tested or under what circumstances; it failed to present evidence as to how testing was
corroborated; it failed to present evidence to support that the theories concerning canine
accelerant detection were proven out or not proven out in testing or under some acceptable procedure; and it failed to present reliable evidence as to whether dogs were able to
accurately alert to accelerant. In essence, there was no evidence concerning the
correctness of the methods used. (R. 207:144-48.) Long's testimony left jurors with the
impression that canine accelerant detection had been tested for accuracy. The testimony
was insufficient. The state failed to establish the first part of the reliability analysis.
(b) The state failed to show that canine accelerant detection is accurate, reliable.
The state was required to prove that canine accelerant detection was accurate. In
this case, Long simply testified, without elaboration, that canine detection had been tested
and corroborated. He did not describe how it was tested. See supra subpoint A. 1 .(a).
In addition, Long admitted at trial that according to early studies, the success rate
for canine accelerant detection was 50 to 82%. (R. 207:171; see also 207:172 (experts
hoped for a 75% success rate).) For a method that offers only two choices (alert vs. no
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alert), a 50 percent success rate is insufficient. By any standard, those statistics represent
guesswork. They do not provide any assurance that canine detection is valid or reliable.
Long also admitted that when a dog alerts to an area for accelerant and the alert is
not confirmed in laboratory testing, in his field the alert is considered to be invalid. (R.
207:152.)
In short, neither Long nor Nelson "could assure the trial court that the [] methods
at issue had any degree of scientific validity or reliability." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, ^fl6.
"[Njeither witness's testimony evokes confidence in the reliability of the scientific
evidence." Id. Even if fire investigators fiercely supported the use of dogs to detect
accelerant, that support does not translate into a belief or proof that such evidence is
sufficiently reliable to be admissible at trial.
An important distinction exists between a tool that is relevant to fire investigation
in determining that an accelerant has been used {i.e. laboratory testing), and a technique
that presents questions about reliability. Since reliability cannot be established in the
field of canine accelerant detection, it lacks evidentiary value at trial.4
4 Imagine a detective who routinely relies on tips to solve his cases. If the detective investigates 20 tips relating to a neighborhood murder, some of which include a sympathetic or emotional plea from scared area residents, and one of which leads to the suspect's
arrest, should the detective be allowed to discuss at trial the tips that cannot be confirmed,
but that add drama and sympathy to the investigation? The answer should be obvious.
In this case, Long and Nelson testified to the use of a dog to detect accelerant.
Oscar "alerted" to two areas in the van. (R. 201:156-57.) The dog's findings could not be
confirmed in laboratory testing. (R. 207:197-200.) Nevertheless, Long relied in part on
the dog's "alerts" to testify that, in his opinion, accelerant was used to start or escalate the
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Although the trial court in this case accorded the state every opportunity to lay an
adequate foundation as it related to the evidentiary value of canine accelerant detection
and Oscar, the state was unable to do so. "In the end, the trial court should have found
the evidence inadmissible, inasmuch as [the defendant] made a proper objection to its
admission. Instead, by admitting the evidence, the trial court failed in its gatekeeping
role." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, Tfl7.
(c) There is no evidence concerning the "qualifications of those " who "actually
gathered the data and analyzed it."
Long provided testimony concerning his experience and training as a fire
investigator. He testified that he had taken classes, he participated and certified in fire
investigation courses and techniques, he served in various positions of authority, and he
served on a committee for the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), which
fire. (See R. 207:145, 155, 160-65.) The concern with Long's and Nelson's testimony is
that even if the dog was used as a tool by the fire investigators, since the dog's findings
could not be confirmed, by industry standards the dog's alerts were invalid and irrelevant.
(See R. 207:152.) If the dog's alerts were simply a step in the process, without adequate
confirmation, that step should not have been discussed or admitted into evidence.
In this case, the state did not treat canine accelerant detection as a simple step in
the process. Indeed, the state presented 11 witnesses, two of which testified to canine
accelerant detection. The testimony of Long and Nelson constituted almost half of the
evidence at trial. In addition, Long testified that he was unable to determine an origin and
cause of the fire based on his independent investigation of the scene. (R. 207:155.)
Rather, he called Oscar to the scene and relied on Oscar's alerts. (R. 207:155-56.) Long
stated that in his opinion, the dog was the best tool in the field. (R. 207:145.)
The alerts provided the basis for Long's opinion testimony. The testimony in this
case elevated the use of the dog over proven laboratory testing. Long should not have
been allowed to testify to canine detection or to matters occurring after he was unable to
ascertain a cause and origin based on his independent investigation. (See R. 207:155-56.)
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published a manual setting forth guidelines, standards and codes for "worldwide" fire
investigation. (R. 207:132-34.)
Long also explained the process he used to determine the "origin and cause of a
fire. (R. 207:135-137.) Long's testimony related to the techniques he employed in fire
investigation. Next, Long testified that he was familiar with canine accelerant detection
through his service on the NFPA committee and in developing guidelines for the
publication. (R. 207:142-44.) Long reviewed studies relating to fire investigation
techniques, including canine accelerant detection, and he assisted in publishing guidelines
and methods based on those studies. (See id.; also 207:149-50.)
There is no evidence in this case that Long ever participated in or actually
observed studies relating to canine accelerant detection; there is no evidence that Long
had any experience in handling dogs for accelerant detection or for any other purpose;
and there is no evidence that Long "actually gathered] the data" (Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at
403) for the studies or analyzed it in connection with preparing the reports. (See record.)
Indeed, according to Long, "Dr. DeHann" was the "true expert" on the matter. (R.
207:144.) Dr. DeHann was not called to testify. In addition, the state failed to present
any evidence ~ through Long or otherwise — concerning DeHann's qualifications to
gather and analyze data for canine accelerant detection. The only evidence presented on
the matter was that DeHann was a forensic chemist and had written articles. (R. 207:14344.) The state presented no information concerning DeHann's knowledge, skill,
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experience, training, education, or work with dogs or fire investigations. (See R.
207:143-50.) Likewise, the state failed to present evidence concerning the testing
techniques employed by DeHann. The lack of information does not support reliability in
the person who allegedly gathered the information or developed the techniques at issue.
To be clear, Schultz is not challenging Long's qualifications as a fire investigator.
See KeUey, 2000 UT 41, ^|14 (a person may be qualified to testify as an expert by virtue
of experience and training); see Pack v. Case, 2001 UT App 232, ^35, 30 P.3d 436 (even
if a person's qualifications extend beyond the specialized knowledge at issue, the person
may testify to the issue; for example, a general building inspector may provide testimony
about roofing). Indeed, Schultz's argument concerning "qualifications" goes to the
"inherent reliability" factor set forth in Rimmasch. Rimniasch, 775 P.2d at 403. A
proponent of scientific or technical evidence must establish the "qualifications" of the
person who actually gathered the data at issue and analyzed it, if the proponent is
presenting evidence of novel principles or techniques. Id.
The "qualification" showing for "inherent reliability" goes to the scientific method
or technique in issue. That is separate from the "qualification" showing that must be made
under the second Rimmasch factor for a testifying expert. See Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641
(step one requires proof that the technique is "inherently reliable," which entails proof
that the person who gathered and analyzed data to support the technique was qualified;
step two requires proof that the testifying expert is qualified to and did properly apply the
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"inherently reliable" technique).5
In this case, Schultz is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as it relates to
the person who allegedly developed the techniques at issue. That is, Dr. DeHann was involved in "actually gathering the data and analyzing it." Thus, evidence of his
qualifications is relevant to establish the inherent reliability of the techniques at issue.
Since the state relied on reports and articles written by DeHann to support Long's
testimony, the state was required to present some evidence regarding DeHann's qualifications. It failed to do so. We are left with a "'dearth of empirical scientific evidence
regarding the . . . reliability' of the [] techniques, with serious questions and doubts
concerning the reliability of those self-same techniques." Franklin, 1999 UT 61, Tfl6.
The experts did not "testify regarding any testing or corroboration of the techniques" Dr.
DeHann employed. IdL The lack of evidence makes it impossible to assess whether
DeHann's reports were prepared by a quack scientist or a respected authority in the field.
The state failed to establish "inherent reliability." Long's testimony regarding

5 Stated another way, Utah appellate courts do not require proof of "inherent reliability"
if the principles at issue are well-established. See Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ^[19.
Nevertheless, the proponent of evidence still must establish that the testifying expert is
qualified through training, experience or education to testify to the matter at issue. See
Patev v. Lainhart 1999 UT 31, ^15, 977 P.2d 1193; State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah
1982). Schultz is not claiming that the state failed to establish Long's qualifications as
they related to fire investigation techniques. Rather, Schultz is claiming that the state
failed to establish the reliability of canine accelerant detection, where it failed to present
evidence concerning the qualifications of the person who developed the technique.
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canine accelerant detection was irrelevant and inadmissible. Since Long's testimony purportedly served as a foundation for Nelson's testimony, Nelson's testimony also was
inadmissible under the "inherent reliability" prong.
Nelson's testimony was inadmissible for additional reasons set forth below.
2. The State Failed to Present Evidence to Support that the Dog, Oscar, Had Any
Measurable Success Rate with Respect to Detecting Accelerant.
"If the proponent of the scientific evidence in question satisfies the threshold
requirement of inherent reliability—either by judicial notice or through a foundational
showing-the trial court must then consider Rimmasch's second and third requirements."
Brewer. 2001 UT 77, ^19 (citing Brown. 948 P.2d at 341; Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641).
Rimmasch's second factor requires the trial court to determine whether the "scientific
principles or techniques have been properly applied to the facts of the particular case by
qualified persons and that the testimony is founded on that work." Brewer, 2001 UT 77,
If 19 (citing Brown, 948 P.2d at 341; Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 398 n.7).
According to the Utah Supreme Court,
In practice, the foundational showing necessary to demonstrate the inherent
reliability of a scientific principle or technique discussed in step one will overlap
with the foundational showing necessary for the admission of scientific evidence
in a particular case discussed in step two. We separate them, however, to
emphasize the point that a foundational showing that a technique is inherently
reliable does not necessarily imply that the technique was properly applied to the
facts of the case by a qualified expert.
Crosby. 927 P.2d at 641 n.2.
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In essence, the second factor requires proof that the expert testifying in the matter
is qualified and has applied the technique properly.6 In this case, the second factor is
irrelevant. Without proof that "canine accelerant detection" is inherently reliable, it is
not necessary to assess whether a qualified person properly applied the techniques; the
evidence already may not be admitted at trial. See Brown, 948 P.2d at 342 (while confidence in the expert's application is important, such evidence is irrelevant if the proponent
has failed to explain how the expert's methods support "reliability" under Rule 702).
In addition, the state failed in its burden of proof under the second factor. Here,
Rex Nelson testified that Oscar the dog attended a program for several weeks in Virginia
and he graduated with a diploma. (R. 207:186.) Nelson also testified that he used a
particular technique with Oscar for training and accelerant detection (R. 207:185-89),
and Nelson observed Oscar. Significantly, Nelson was unable to testify whether Oscar
could correctly detect the use of an accelerant. (R. 207:195.) Thus, there was no way to
assess whether the techniques were accurate, or specifically, whether the techniques were
accurate as they related to Oscar in this case.
6 In KeUey, 2000 UT 41, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated that if a proponent is relying
on a technique or method that has a proven track record in scientific and legal communities, the proponent is not required to establish the first factor — "inherent reliability" - as
set forth in Rimmasch. See KeUey, 2000 UT 41, ^fl9. Nevertheless, the court will assess
whether the proponent established the second and third factors. The proponent must
show that the expert is qualified and has knowledge that can assist the jury in resolving
issues. See KeUey, 2000 UT 41,1ffll2-l4; Patev. 1999 UT 31,1HJ17-18, 24 (while
"inherent reliability" factor did not apply to testimony about endodontic treatment; court
assessed expert's qualifications and whether he used proper techniques in treatment).
31

In addition, the state failed in this case to present evidence concerning Oscar's
performance in the Virginia program, whether dogs in the program were required to meet
a specific success rate before graduation, what Oscar's standing was in his class, or what
Oscar's success rate in the program was, among other things. (R. 207 in general.) In that
regard, in addition to the paucity of evidence to support that canine accelerant detection
was reliable (supra subpoint A.I., herein), there was no evidence to support that Long or
Nelson had any way to tell whether Oscar performed with any measurable amount of
success in investigating for accelerant, either generally or in this case.
Stated another way, without evidence to support that canine accelerant detection is
inherently reliable (see supra subpoint A.I., herein), and without evidence concerning
Oscar's success rate, there is no confidence in the technique in this case, and no confidence in how it was applied. Likewise, there is no reason to believe that Oscar actually
applied the "technique" and accurately detected accelerant. The relevant evidence on the
matter supports that Oscar's alerts were invalid. (See R. 207:152 (alerts not confirmed in
laboratory testing are invalid); 207:197-200 (Oscar's "alerts" to accelerant could not be
confirmed).) In this case, the state failed to prove the second factor.
3. The Evidence Concerning Canine Accelerant Detection Was Confusing and
Conflicting. It Lacked Probative Value and Should Have Been Excluded at Trial.
With regard to the third factor set forth in Rimmasch, the state was required to
establish that the evidence relating to canine accelerant detection and Oscar was more
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probative than prejudicial. Crosby, 927 P.2d at 641.
In State v. Crosby, we described the third prong as "whether the proffered
scientific evidence will be more probative than prejudicial as required by rule
403." 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996). However, Crosby was not intended to alter
rule 403 determinations in any way. Properly stated, the third prong of the rule 702
admissibility test is whether the probative value of the proffered scientific
evidence "is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. Evid. 403
(emphasis added).
Mead, 2001 UT 58,1J40 n.6. Also,
"[t]he question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert evidence is
whether, on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact." State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Helpfulness depends upon "whether the subject is within the knowledge or
experience of the average individual." Id. However, "[i]t is not necessary that the
subject of the testimony be so erudite or arcane that the jurors could not possibly
understand it without the aid of expert testimony, nor is it a requirement that the
subject be beyond the comprehension of each and every juror." Id "This
'helpfulness standard' also implicates Rule 403 considerations, since if the
evidence is confusing or unfairly prejudicial it will hinder rather than aid jury
decision making." Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce, Utah Evidence Law
7-9 (1996) (clarifying that "Rule 403 is not being applied directly, so ... the
question is 'helpfulness,' not whether the probative value is greatly outweighed by
confusion or prejudice"); see also Larsen. 865 P.2d at 1363 n. 12; State v.
Rimmasch. 775 P.2d 388, 398 n. 8 (Utah 1989).
Campbell v. State Farm Ins. Co.. 2001 UT 89, Tf86, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44.
Here the testimony presented through Long and Nelson, with Oscar sitting
obediently in front of the jury, was unfairly prejudicial, confusing, misleading to the jury,
and a waste of time. In sum, it consisted of the following: Long arrived at the scene of
the fire. He engaged in an independent investigation. Based on that investigation, Long
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identified "some unusual burn patterns." Long did not elaborate on the patterns. Long
testified that based on his initial, independent investigation, he was unable to ascertain a
point of origin, and consequently a cause for the fire. (See R. 207:155-56.)
Thereafter, Long contacted Nelson and asked him to bring Oscar to the scene. (R.
207:155-56.) When Oscar arrived, he alerted to two areas in the van and he later alerted
to socks and shoes belonging to Schultz.
During trial, Long admitted that in his field, canine alerts are deemed to be invalid
if they cannot be confirmed in laboratory testing. (R. 207:152.) In this case, the canine
alerts could not be confirmed in laboratory testing. (R. 207:197-200.) They were invalid.
Nevertheless, Long testified that in his opinion, the canine is the best tool available
to fire investigators. (R. 207:145.) Also, he relied on Oscar's alerts in forming his
opinions in the matter. (See R. 207:145, 155-56, 159-65,201-02.) Based on Oscar's
investigation of the scene, Long opined that the fire originated in the area where Oscar
alerted, that an accelerant was used, and that the fire was intentionally set. (R. 207:16365; 207:201-02.)
Nelson testified exclusively to the use of Oscar and to Oscar's alerts in two areas
of the van and to his alerts to items of clothing belonging to Schultz. (R. 207:184-95.)
Oscar sat obediently in front of the jury during Nelson's testimony.
Evidence that officials used a dog was not probative, particularly where there was
no ability to confirm the dog's findings through reliable scientific testing. That is, even if
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the state's evidence concerning canine accelerant detection went only to the use of Oscar
as a tool in the investigation, the evidence was irrelevant and lacked probative value. It
was improper for the state to discuss the use of the dog.
To further illustrate the matter, the state's evidence concerning the dog may be
compared to evidence of the polygraph test, a tool that has not gained reliability in the
legal community for evidentiary purposes. The polygraph test is an investigative tool that
allows officials to obtain confessions or other information from a suspect. See Brown,
948 P.2d at 340 (defendant submitted to polygraph test at the request of police). It may
be considered an effective tool. Nevertheless, the polygraph may yield erroneous results.
Courts have refused to admit evidence of a polygraph test at trial. See id at 342 and n.5;
Crosby, 927 P.2d at 642-43. That is, a party may not disclose either that a polygraph test
was used, or the results of such a test at trial. The information is irrelevant. See Brown,
948 P.2d at 342 (ruling that polygraph evidence is inadmissible); see also U.S. v. Murray,
784 F.2d 188 (6th Cir. 1986) (government is precluded at trial from mentioning the words
"polygraph examination").
In this case, the state's emphasis and reliance on the inadmissible evidence was
misleading and confusing. Since the alerts could not be confirmed, evidence of the alerts
was not probative and did not assist the jury in resolving issues. Indeed, the state's
emphasis on the evidence sent a message to the jury that Oscar's contributions were more
significant and trustworthy than laboratory testing. (R. 207:145 (Long testified that the
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canine was the best tool available in fire investigations).) Yet, even by industry
standards, Oscar's alerts were invalid. (See R. 207:152.)
In the end, reliable evidence relating to accelerant came from the lab technician.
McNair testified that based on her scientific studies and tests, she could not confirm the
use of an accelerant in the van fire or on Schultz's clothing. (R. 207:197-200.)
The careful exploration that needed to be made in this case was disregarded in its
entirety. "[W]e are convinced that trial courts sometimes admit 'scientific1 evidence
without scrutinizing its foundation carefully." Rimmasch. 775 P.2d at 399.
The difficulty presented by the record in the instance case is that the trial court did
not follow the approach dictated by [Phillips v. Jackson. 615 P.2d 1228 (Utah
1980),] and the State made no real effort to lay a foundation that would permit a
determination of reliability.
Id. at 403. "The trial court admitted the evidence over objection, apparently on the erroneous assumption [that] the lack of foundation went to the weight, not to the admissibility of
the evidence." Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 407. "[I]t can be said that evidence not shown to
be reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible." Crosby, 927 P.2d at 640
(cites omitted). In this case, the evidence concerning Oscar was inadmissible.
4. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion. Based on the Paucity of Evidence on
the Matter, a Mindful Judge Would Have Excluded Evidence Relating to Canine
Accelerant Detection.
Evidence presented at trial in this case supported that a dog may accurately alert to

36

an accelerant 50 to 82% of the time. (R. 207:171.) Also, according to industry standards,
if a canine alert cannot be confirmed in laboratory testing, it is invalid. (R. 207:152.)
According to the evidence presented in this matter, although Oscar alerted to two
areas in the van and to items of clothing belonging to Schultz, the Utah State Crime
Laboratory test results were negative. (R. 207:197-200.) Also, neither Long nor Nelson
could provide any information concerning Oscar's success rate in detecting accelerant.
Based on those facts, a reasonable judge would have precluded the state from presenting
evidence at trial concerning canine accelerant detection. See Acri, 662 N.E.2d at 117
(dog alerted to the use of accelerant in a home fire, while laboratory analysis came back
negative; since reliability could not be established, court ruled that evidence concerning
canine accelerant detection was inadmissible); Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance, 14 S.W.3d
at 519-20 (investigator's testimony was offered to explain why the dog made five alerts
and the laboratory detected accelerant in two samples; the investigator's testimony was
inadmissible where the proponent "failed to carry its burden of proof on the issue of
reliability").
Indeed, any reasonable trial judge would have rejected the evidence as unreliable
based simply on the studies showing a 50 to 82 % accuracy rating. (See R. 206:3-7.) For
a method that offers only two choices - "alert" vs. "no alert" - the same success rate may
be reached by flipping a coin as part of the investigation. That is insufficient.
In this case, the trial judge not only allowed the state to discuss canine accelerant
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detection, but also the experts' testimony comprised almost half the evidence presented
by the state at trial. In addition, Oscar was allowed to sit in front of jurors in order that
they could observe his professional, gentle and respectful demeanor.
Further, Long was allowed to testify that he could not think of a better tool available to investigators than a dog (compare R. 207:145, with 206:7 (prosecutor claimed the
state would not present evidence to support that "a dog is better than" some unidentified
tool in fire investigating)); and he based his opinion concerning the use of an accelerant
and the origin and cause of the fire on Oscar's alerts. That was improper. The evidence
lacked reliability and foundation, and it was presented in a way to discredit results from
the state crime lab.
The trial court abused its discretion and committed legal error in allowing Long
and Nelson to testify to canine accelerant detection and in allowing Oscar to sit in front of
the jury during trial. As set forth below, the trial court's error compels the entry of an
order reversing the conviction in this case.
B. THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE WAS PREJUDICIAL REQUIRING
REVERSAL.
The Utah Supreme Court articulated the prejudice standard under Rimmasch as
follows: "If, in the absence of the evidentiary errors, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for defendant, we must reverse the conviction." Rimmasch, 775
P.2d at 407; Campbell 2001 UT 89,184; State v. Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1122 (Utah
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1989) (in assessing prejudice, this Court will consider the case absent the evidence that
was wrongfully admitted).
In Rimmasch, defendant's daughter, the victim of child sexual abuse, "described
[during a trial] the alleged incident of sexual activity" for which defendant was charged.
Rimmasch, 775 P.2d at 390. In addition, experts for the state testified that the daughter
had been abused, and some of the experts expressed that defendant was the culprit. Id
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in allowing the expert
testimony. Because the case "hinged on a determination of credibility," the court found
that allowing the evidence constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 407.
The court recognized that erroneous admissions are more critical in a jury trial, kL
since the judge in a bench trial is able to distinguish between substantive and other types
of evidence (i.e. impeachment, cumulative). The Rimmasch case was tried to the bench.
Schultz's case went to a jury. Long and Nelson provided the only testimony that
an accelerant was used in the fire. Long testified that he detected "unusual burn patterns"
in his initial investigation, but he did not elaborate on the matter. (R. 207:154-55.)
Long also indicated that the fire grew fast for the amount of time the van was not
occupied. (R. 207:155-68.) However, Long did not elaborate on that alleged observation
and he did not discuss how long he believed the van was unoccupied. (See 206:29 (the
van may have been unoccupied for 15 to 30 minutes)). According to industry standards,
the time line relating to a fire is important only if the investigator makes accurate
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observations. See NFPA921 Guide for Fire and Explosion Investigations (2001 ed.) §17.2
(discussing time line for fire investigation, and specifying that "the value of a time line" is
dependent upon the accuracy of the information used to develop the time line).
Also, based on his initial investigation, Long was unable to ascertain a point of
origin — and consequently a cause for the fire. (R. 207:155.) Thereafter, Long contacted
Nelson and asked him to bring Oscar to the scene. (R. 207:155-56.) When Oscar arrived,
he alerted to two areas in the van and he later alerted to socks and shoes belonging to
Schultz. Based on Oscar's investigation, Long opined that the fire originated in the areas
where the dog alerted, an accelerant was used in the fire, and it was intentionally set. (R.
207:145, 155-56, 156-57, 159-60; 207:201-02.)
Long's testimony concerning canine accelerant detection should not have been
admitted in evidence at trial. In addition, his opinions concerning the origin and cause of
the fire were inadmissible since they were based on Oscar's alerts.
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a declaration on an ultimate issue in a case
"is inadmissible 'where an expert witness has not testified to sufficient facts on which to
base his opinion." Patey, 1999 UT 31, TJ23. "The expertise of the witness, his degree of
familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and the
facts adduced must be established." Patey, 1999 UT 31, «fl23 (cites omitted).
In this case, since Oscar's alerts were invalid and inadmissible, the state lacked
sufficient facts in evidence to support Long's opinion testimony. Where the grounds for
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Long's opinion testimony were erroneous, the opinions were erroneous. Also, since
Nelson's testimony related entirely to canine accelerant detection, it was inadmissible.
With respect to the remaining evidence in the case, it was circumstantial,
conflicting and inconsistent. Without the state's evidence that an accelerant was used to
start or escalate the fire, the jury likely would have concluded that the fire was an
accident. Likewise, without the state's evidence that Oscar detected accelerant on items
of clothing belonging to Schultz, the jury would have concluded that the state had no
evidence directly linking Schultz to the fire.
Additional evidence presented at trial supported that Schultz was observed on the
roof of the L-shaped building (R. 206:49-50, 51-53, 59-60 (Pavelchak observed Schultz
on the building); R. 206:25-26, 37-38 (testimony of Espinoza and Villegas)), and a person
possibly matching Schultz's description was observed in the area of the van. (See R.
206:79-80; 206:90,94 (testimony of Stapley and Charli).) Significantly, no witness
observed how the fire started or who started it.
Also, Pavelchak testified that he heard Schultz mumble that he would "get [those]
guys" involved in an altercation with him. (R. 206:47.) That evidence does not support
intentional arson, since such threats are often expressed in anger or frustration without
ramification. Further, there is no evidence connecting the mumbled words to the van fire.
(See record in general.) Pavelchak's testimony left unanswered questions that the jury
may have resolved based on the evidence from Long that an accelerant was used to start
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the fire. For example, Pavelchak did not observe Schultz start the fire. In addition, he did
not have any information as to how the fire began. If the jury had not been exposed to the
improper evidence, it may have concluded that Pavelchak's testimony did not shed light
on the matter.
Next, Crofoot and Pascaldo testified that Schultz made spontaneous statements
when he was in custody. Crofoot and Pascaldo had conflicting recollections about the
statements. If jurors believed Pascaldo, Schultz stated that he did not mean to hurt
anyone. (R. 206:121.) That statement can be explained as follows: earlier, witnesses
observed Schultz in an altercation with two men outside a bar. The altercation involved
fisticuffs. (R. 206:45.) Schultz's statement likely related to an injury that he believed he
may have caused to a person involved in the altercation.
Lastly, McNair presented testimony in this case on the use of accelerant. She
testified that clothing belonging to Schultz and samples from the van tested negative for
ignitable liquid. If that admissible testimony had been the only evidence on the matter,
the jury likely would have concluded that no accelerant was used to start the fire. The
jury likely would have concluded that the state failed to establish "intent." (See e.g. R.
207:201-02 (Long testified that he believed the fire was intentional because he believed
accelerant was used in the fire).)7

7 Even if Long based his opinion testimony on his independent investigation, Schultz is
still prejudiced by the admission of the improper evidence in this case. (Continued . ..)
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Absent the evidence relating to canine accelerant detection, the state's case
consisted only of testimony from witnesses who saw a person by the van, witnesses who
testified that Schultz was on top of the L-shaped building, and witnesses who chased
Schultz even though they did not witness any wrongdoing on his part. The testimony
required the jury to make certain leaps across gaps in the evidence. There is a reasonable
likelihood that if the jury had not been mislead by the evidence concerning canine
accelerant detection, the jury would have reached a result more favorable to Schultz.
In other contexts, Utah appellate courts have refused to find "harmless" error
where the evidence on a critical issue is circumstantial, or where the jury was required to
resolve conflicts in the evidence. State v. Bvrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);

By way of explanation, assuming arguendo the jury had not been exposed to
evidence concerning canine accelerant detection, the jury would have been required to
resolve conflicts between Long's testimony that an accelerant was used, and McNair's
testimony that laboratory test results did not confirm the use of an accelerant. In that
instance, jurors likely would have favored proven laboratory testing over human
observations.
Further, if the jury did not believe Long's testimony concerning the use of an
accelerant, the jury likely would have discredited Long's testimony on other matters. For
example, the jury may have questioned the motives behind Long's investigation.
Specifically, in ruling out the possibility that the van fire was an accident, Long testified
that he asked the van owner if he had problems with the van in the past. The van owner
answered no. Long also checked the engine and dash for electrical problems, and he
eliminated those areas as relevant to the investigation. Significantly, Long did not
mention any investigation into the possibility that faulty wiring going to a TV in the van
may have contributed to the fire, and he did not mention the possibility that the boys, who
were last to occupy the van, had information regarding the matter. Thus, with Long's
credibility in issue, the jury likely would have been inclined to question Long's motives
in the investigation.
43

State v. Trov, 688 P.2d 483, 486-87 (Utah 1984); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400, 403
(Utah 1986) (when the evidence in the record is circumstantial or sufficiently conflicting,
court is less likely to find harmless error).
In this case, the evidence was circumstantial and it required the jury to resolve
conflicts and inconsistencies. The jurors may have been searching for some reason to
believe the fire was intentionally set. The evidence concerning Oscar may have provided
jurors with that reason. In addition, the jurors observed Oscar in court during the
testimony. That likely caused them to sympathize with an obedient dog. In seeking to
make some sense of the irrelevant, but highly emphasized information, the jurors may
have been unduly influenced by Oscar's part in the investigation. The inadmissible
evidence influenced the jurors' verdict in the matter, requiring reversal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Appellant Troy Schultz respectfully requests that
this Court reverse and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise

